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Practically, even if a court determines that a fee is not reasonable, the oversecured
creditor may still recover a proportion of its "unreasonable" fees under section 502.3 The
majority of courts will allow oversecured creditors to recover part of the unreasonable portion of
the fees as an unsecured claim. However, some circuit courts have not specifically reach this
issue.4
This Article will examine the split among courts regarding whether state or federal law
governs post-petition attorneys’ fees. Part I generally examines section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code. Part II discusses the spilt on whether state or federal law govern post-petition attorneys’
fees and how the majority and minority of courts have ruled on this issue, analyzing the
reasoning and arguments behind those courts’ decisions. Part III discusses how an oversecured
creditor may be entitled to an unsecured claim for the “unreasonable” portion of it attorneys’ fees
under section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code. Finally, Part IV identifies the implications for an
oversecured creditor’s attorneys in bankruptcy proceedings.
Overview of Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code
Generally, under section 506(b), an oversecured creditor is entitled to post-petition
interest on its claim, and "any [post-petition] reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for
under the agreement or state statute under which such claim arose."5 Under section 506(b), an
oversecured creditor’s post-petition6 fees, costs, or charges are allowed if (1) the oversecured
creditor has an allowed oversecured claim, (2) the post-petition fees, costs, or charges are

3

However, if the plan provides that the unsecured creditor is entitled to receive all of its fees under the contract, the
distinction between reasonable and unreasonable fees is eliminated. Thus, the creditor will be entitled to one
hundred percent of the fees, not just a portion.
4
See In re 804 Cong., L.L.C., 756 F.3d 368, 380 (5th Cir. 2014) (questioning whether oversecured creditor “have
included included in their briefing in this court regarding treatment of their claims, or parts of their claims, as
unsecured claims under § 502 were raised in the bankruptcy court”).
5
11 U.S.C. § 506(b).
6
See In re Nunez, 317 B.R. 666, 670 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2004) (“[s]ection 506(b) applies only to post-petition interest,
fees and costs sought as part of a secured claim.”).
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provided for under an agreement or a state statute under which the creditor’s claim arose, and (3)
the post-petition fees, costs or charges are "reasonable."7 However, section 506(b) does not
indicate whether state or federal law applies in determining whether such fees are "reasonable."
This lack of statutory guidance has, thus, resulted in a court split regarding which law governs
the court’s determination of whether an oversecured creditor’s attorneys’ fees are reasonable.
The Three-Way Spilt in Determining Whether to Allow an Oversecured Creditor’s
Attorneys’ Fees
As noted above, there is a three-way split among courts as to whether state or federal law
applies in determining whether attorney fees are "reasonable". The majority of courts rule that
federal law preempts state law as to the enforceability and reasonableness of oversecured claims.
Most of the minority courts rule that state law governs enforceability and federal law governs
reasonableness, but some outlier courts ruled that state law governs.
The majority of courts have reasoned that federal law preempts state law based on section
506(b)’s plain language and legislative history. The minority of courts, however, have held that
state law governs on whether the agreement is enforceable, and then federal law governs on
whether the post-petition fees are reasonable based their reason on that the bankruptcy courts,
courts of equity, should enforce a creditor’s legal rights whether it is based as a contractual right
or property right. Further, there are outlier courts that have simply ruled that state law governs
reasonableness of an oversecured creditor’s attorneys’ fees.
a. Majority Rule – Federal Law Governs
The majority of courts held that federal law, not state law, governs whether post-petition
attorney fees are reasonable under section 506(b). In so holding, the majority of courts stress that

7

See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).
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there is no reference to state law in section 506(b)’s plain language.8 Section 506(b), which
directs courts to "allow[s] any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the
agreement under which such claim arose,"9 does not direct courts to allow oversecured claims in
accordance with state law. Thus, state law should not govern attorneys’ fees. Further, the
majority of courts reasoned that other sections of the Bankruptcy Code indicate “that Congress,
when it desired to do so, knew how to restrict the scope of applicable law to ‘state law’ and did
so with some frequency.”10 Therefore, these courts reasoned that the absence of such language in
section 506(b) indicates that federal law should govern whether an oversecured creditor’s
attorneys’ fees are reasonable under section 506(b).11
Moreover, the majority of courts opine that section 506(b)’s legislative history indicates
that federal law preempts state law in governing the reasonableness of post-petition fee
provisions.12 The courts noted that while the House of Representatives and the Senate each
passed a different draft of the provision,13 ultimately, the Senate draft was enacted. On one hand,
the House draft provided that “there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, to the extent
collectible under applicable law . . . any reasonable fees,”14 favoring application of state law. On

8

See In re Schriock Constr., 104 F.3d 200, 202 (“Section 506(b) itself does not direct us to state law.”); In re Ctr.,
282 B.R. 561, 566 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2002) (“Section 506(b) makes no reference to state law.”).
9
11 U.S.C. § 506(b).
10
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); See also 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (“An entity may be a debtor under
chapter 9 of this title if and only if such entity”… is authorized by state law) (emphasis added); 11 U.S.C. § 523
(stating debt for arising from a separation agreement of divorce decree made in accordance with state or territorial
law is not dischargeable) (emphasis added); 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (“[A] State law prescribing a method of composition
of indebtedness of such municipality may not bind” non-consenting creditors).
11
In re Ctr., 282 B.R. at 566 (indicating absence of state law reference is evidence of Congress’ intention of state
law preemption). Thus, when the text of a Bankruptcy Code section is not explicitly limited to state law, the statute
should be plainly read and be enforced according to its terms
12
Joseph F. Sanson Inv. Co. v. 268 Ltd. (In re 268, Ltd.), 789 F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Section 506(b)'s
legislative history also favors reading the statute as preempting the state law governing the reasonableness of fee
provisions.”).
13
In re Schriock Constr., 104 F.3d at 202.
14
H.R. 8200, 95 Cong., 1st Sess. § 506(b) (1977).
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the other hand, the Senate draft did not include the language “under applicable law,”15 favoring
application of federal law. Therefore, majority of courts reasoned that by enacting the Senate
draft, “Congress declined to require that the bankruptcy courts consult the governing state law to
determine the reasonableness of fees claimed under [section] 506.”16 Further, these courts have
noted that the floor managers of the bill, Senator De Concini and Representative Edwards,
reported to Congress that the House version of the bill was rejected and that if a security
agreement provided for attorneys’ fees, it will be enforced under the Bankruptcy Code,
notwithstanding contrary law.17 Thus, with the guidance of section 506(b)’s plain language and
legislative history, the majority of courts concluded that federal law should apply to determine
the reasonableness of post-petition fees.
b. Minority Rule – State Law Governs
The minority courts have held that state law should govern an oversecured creditor’s
post-petition attorneys’ fees’ validity and enforceability, but federal law governs reasonableness.
There is a split on whether the validity of post-petition fees arises from contractual law or
property law. Nevertheless, after the validity of fees is established, the minority of courts state
that the fees should undergo a section 506(b) reasonableness analysis.18
As a preliminary matter, the minority of courts stated that bankruptcy courts are courts of
equity.19 Thus, the minority of courts asserted that bankruptcy courts cannot “modify or ignore
the terms of the legal obligation.”20 The minority courts reasoned that a party should be able to
stand upon the terms of a valid contract in a court of equity just as that party would in a court of

15

S. 2266, 95 Cong., 2d Sess. § 506(b) (1978).
In re 268, Ltd., 789 F.2d at 678.
17
In re Schriock Constr., 104 F.3d at 202.
18
See In re Sholos, 11 B.R. 782, 784 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981).
19
Manufacturers' Fin. Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 448 (1935).
20
Id.
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY
11439
16

5

law.21 However, if the party is looking for equitable relief, then the bankruptcy court should be
allowed to use its “extraordinary powers” to grant that party pure equitable relief.22 In cases
where oversecured creditors are attempting to recover attorneys’ fees, however, creditors are
seeking to enforce a legal right, not equitable relief.
State law governs the validity and enforceability of state law. On one hand, some courts
have reasoned that these legal rights arise from underlying contractual rights. These courts
asserted that the validity and construction of cost recovery contract clauses must be assessed
under state law.23 These courts further reasoned that “[local law] which subsist at the time and
place of the making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form a part of it,
as fully as if they had been expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms.”24 Thus, the
underlying agreement “embraces alike those laws which affect its construction and those which
affect its enforcement or discharge.”25
Consequently, any contractual indebtedness is “not subject to statutory limitations on
reimbursement for expenses of administering the estate.”26 If any contract provides for attorneys’
fees, state law should govern its validity.27
On the other hand, other courts held that the validity of fees might arise as a matter of
property rights.28 Under section 541(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor's bankruptcy estate

21

Id. (“A party may stand upon the terms of a valid contract in a court of equity as he may in a court of law.”).
Id.
23
In re United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 674 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The Court recognized that ‘(t)he validity
and construction of the (contract clause providing for recovery of costs) must … be judged according to (state)
law….’” (quoting In re Cont'l Vending Mach. Corp., 543 F.2d 986, 993 (2d Cir. 1976))).
24
Farmers' & Merchants' Bank of Monroe, N.C. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Va., 262 U.S. 649, 660 (1923).
See Sec. Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 278 U.S. 149, 153, 49 S. Ct. 84, 85, 73 L. Ed. 236 (1928) (“The validity of the
lien claimed by the mortgage company for attorney's fees must be [determined by state law] for the contract was
there made and was secured by real estate there situate.”).
25
Farmers' & Merchants' Bank of Monroe, N.C. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Va., 262 U.S. at 660.
26
In re United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 674 F.2d at 139.
27
In re Salisbury, 58 B.R. 635, 640 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985) (determining attorneys’ fees under state law’s concept
of reasonableness).
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includes “all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the case.”29 When a borrower executes a deed of trust, the lender receives an equitable title
interest in the underlying property and, thus, an equitable interest in the borrower’s property
subject to state law.30 After, the federal bankruptcy court should ensure that the mortgagee is
afforded the same protection that mortgagee would have under state law if no bankruptcy had
ensued, specifically the recovery of attorneys’ fee.
When it comes to the section 506(b)’s analysis, these courts all state that the
reasonableness of such attorneys’ fees are matters of federal law.31 The courts do not make any
analysis, but cite to treatises and or past cases that plainly state federal law applies.32
Finally, there are the outlier minority courts that simply state that state law should govern
an oversecured creditor’s attorneys’ fees.33 However, these cases are usually from the 1980’s and
are undermined by its respective higher courts.34
Unsecured Claims for the “Unreasonable” Portion of Attorneys’ Fees.
Generally, if a court determines that some or all of the attorneys’ fees are not
"reasonable" under section 506(b), the oversecured creditor may still be entitled to an unsecured
claim for the “unreasonable” portion of the attorneys’ post-petition fees, costs, or charges under

28

Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (“Property interests are created and defined by state law.”); In re
Chateaugay Corp., 150 B.R. at 538 (“As a general rule, the underlying property rights of parties in a bankruptcy
case are determined in accordance with applicable state law.”); In re Virginia Foundry Co., 9 B.R. 493, 495 (W.D.
Va. 1981) (“In bankruptcy proceedings, the extent and nature of property rights are determined in accordance with
state rather than federal common law.”)
29
11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2014).
30
See Williams v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, 349 S.W.3d 90, 94 (Tex. App. 2011) (“When a borrower executes a
deed of trust, … the borrower… retained the property's legal title, and the lender … held two equitable title interests
in the property, one for each deed of trust.”).
31
In re Schrader Body, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1349, 1351 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (“[T]he reasonableness and enforceability in
bankruptcy are matters of federal law.”). See In re Alpine Grp., Inc., 151 B.R. 931, 935 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993); In re
Sholos, 11 B.R. at 785.
32
In re Schrader Body, Inc., 315 F. Supp. at 1351 (citing to Collier on Bankruptcy and case law); In re Alpine Grp.,
Inc., 151 B.R. at 935 (citing to past case law).
33
In re Triangle Equip. Co., Inc., 26 B.R. 175, 177 (W.D. Va. 1982).
34
See In re Saunders, 130 B.R. 208, 212 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991).
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section 502.35 As a practical result, most if not all courts36 hold that section 502 allows for all
claims unless it meets any of the section 502(b) exceptions.37
For example, in Welzel v. Advocate Realty Inv. LLC (In re Welzel)38, the Eleventh Circuit
held that a secured creditor is able to recover a secured claim for a reasonable amount, and an
unsecured claim for the unreasonable amount.39 The Eleventh Circuit noted that while section
506 dealt with the allowance of oversecured claims, the statute does not state that that fees
deemed unreasonable are to be disallowed.40 Rather, section 502 deals with the allowance of a
claim.41 Section 502 indicates that a claim filed under section 501 the Bankruptcy Code is
deemed allowed “unless a party of interest . . . objects.”42 If an objection arises, section 502
“shall allow that claim” unless the claim meets one of the exceptions enumerated in section
502(b).43 Further, while section 502 does not differentiate between unreasonable and reasonable
claims, section 506(b) focuses on the reasonableness of an oversecured claim.44 Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the plain meaning of section 502 and 506 signified that “[section]
506(b) is meant not to displace the general instructions laid down in [section] 502, but to be read
together with [section] 502 in a complementary manner.”45 Section 506’s title, “Determination of

35

See 11 U.S.C. § 502.
However, some courts have not addressed this issue yet. See In re 804 Cong., L.L.C., 756 F.3d at 380. And some
courts do not agree. See In re 900 Corp., 327 B.R. 585 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005).
37
See Welzel v. Advocate Realty Inv. LLC (In re Welzel), 275 F.3d 1308, 1320 (11th Cir. 2001).
38
275 F.3d at 1308.
39
See id. at 1320 (“[A] claim for fees should be bifurcated between secured and unsecured claims based on the
amount of fees deemed reasonable.”); See also UPS Capital Bus. Credit v. Gencarelli (In re Gencarelli), 501 F.3d 1,
5 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that § 502 “allows the ultimate test for allowability, and any claim satisfying that test is …
collectible as an unsecured claim”).
40
See In re Welzel, 275 F.3d at 1317.
41
See 11 U.S.C. § 502.
42
11 U.S.C. § 502(a).
43
Id. § 502(b).
44
Id. § 506(b)
45
In re Welzel, 275 F.3d at 1317.
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY
8
11439
36

secured status,” indicates that it is narrowly focuses on whether a claim is secured, oversecured,
or not secured as opposed to whether a claim is initially allowed under section 502.46
In contrast, there are a minority of courts that would not allow the recovery of the
unreasonable portion of post-petition fees, cost, or chargers as an unsecured claim. For instance,
in In re 900 Corp.47, the bankruptcy court held that an unsecured claim for post-petition
attorneys’ fees cannot be recovered, even where provided by an agreement,48 and reduced an
oversecured creditor’s attorney fees from $191,435.50, as provided for under an agreement, to
$140,382.28, disallowing the rest.49 The bankruptcy court reasoned that the oversecured
creditor’s attorneys did not exercise careful billing judgment, and granting the attorney fees as an
unsecured claim would run contrary to section 506(b)’s purpose, which is to “protect estate
assets from excessive fees by oversecured creditors' attorneys exhibiting excessive caution,
overzealous advocacy and hyperactive legal efforts.”50 The bankruptcy further noted that the
counsel providing professional services bears the burden of exercising particularly careful billing
judgment.51
Implications for Oversecured Creditors
Oversecured creditors are generally entitled to post-petition reasonable fees, costs, or
charges provided for under a contract or state statute. However, oversecured creditors holding an
oversecured claim may be limited to a reasonable portion of its post-petition reasonable fees,
costs, or charges. This can lead to the oversecured creditor recovering fewer fees than it would
have had state law governed.

46

Id.
In re 900 Corp., 327 B.R. 585 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005).
48
Id. at 600.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 599.
51
Id.
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The overwhelming majority of courts held that the reasonableness determination is
determined under federal law. Some minority courts expand on this and require that any postpetition reasonable fees, costs, or charges be, first, enforceable under state law. However, it
seems likely that the majority of courts that held federal law preempts state law presume that
post-petition reasonable fees, costs, or charges are nevertheless enforceable under state law.
Oversecured creditors should be prepared to demonstrate that any post-petition attorneys’ fees
are reasonable, which requires documentation or testimony evidencing the fees’
reasonableness,52 or consult with local rules regarding collecting post-petition attorneys’ fees.
Accordingly, under the majority rule, since federal law might vary significantly from state law,
an oversecured creditor might not be able entitled to a secured claim for its “unreasonable”
attorneys’ fees, even though such fees would be recoverable under state law. However, an
oversecured creditor might still be able to recover at least some of the “unreasonable” portion of
its attorneys’ fees. Specifically, even under the majority rule53, an oversecured creditor may be
entitled to an unsecured claim for the “unreasonable” portion of it attorneys’ fees under section
502.54
Conclusion
Currently, there is a three-way split among courts in determining what law governs
whether an oversecured creditor is entitled to its claim, under section 506(b), for post-petition
fees, costs, or charges provided for under a contract or state statute. The majority of courts hold
that federal law preempts state law as to the enforceability and reasonableness of these claims.
52

See In re 804 Congress, L.L.C. at 372 (suggesting proper applications for attorneys’ fees and supporting
documentation and testimony will evidence reasonableness under section 506(b)).
53
Id. at 378 (“Several courts have concluded that § 506(b) deals with the priority of secured claims, not allowance
of claims.44 These same courts have indicated that certain claims for amounts found not to be reasonable under §
506(b) may be recoverable under § 502.”).
54
See 11 U.S.C. 502 (2012). Section 502 indicates that a claim filed under section 501 the Bankruptcy Code is
deemed allowed unless a party of interest objects. If an objection arises, section 502 shall allow that claim unless the
claim meets one of the exceptions enumerated in section 502(b).
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The minority courts are split: most minority courts hold that state law governs enforceability and
federal law governs reasonableness; some outlier minority courts ruled that state law governs
both the enforceability and reasonableness. However, these outlier cases have been overruled and
are no longer good law in their jurisdictions. Finally, some courts will still allow unreasonable
post-petition attorney's fees as an unsecured claim under section 502.
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